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In his 2007 paper “Quantum Sleeping Beauty”, Peter Lewis poses a problem for
appeals to subjective probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Lewis’s argument hinges on parallels between the traditional “sleeping beauty” prob-
lem in epistemology and his quantum variant. These two cases, Lewis argues, treat
probability differently despite the fact that they share important epistemic similarities,
thus leading to a tension between the traditional solution to the sleeping beauty prob-
lem (typically called the “thirder” solution) and Everettian quantum mechanics. My
purpose in this paper is to examine the metaphysical and epistemological differences
between these two cases and, on this basis, determine if Lewis’s argument for a trou-
bling tension between the Everettian and the thirder is as powerful as Lewis suggests.
In particular, I examine the way in which diachronic Dutch book arguments suggest
that the thirder solution in the traditional case is correct while the Everettian’s solution
in the quantum case is correct. These Dutch book arguments, I argue, reveal an im-
portant disanalogy between the two cases, and thus Lewis’s argument does not reveal
an inconsistency in either the Everettian’s or the thirder’s treatment of probability.
1 Introduction
The traditional “sleeping beauty” problem goes as follows: consider a person (for
convention’s sake, call her “Beauty”) who is the subject of a rather bizarre experiment.
Beauty is put to sleep on Sunday night, after which her experimenters flip a coin. If
the coin lands on heads, Beauty is awakened on Monday and on Tuesday; however,
after waking on Monday, a memory drug is administered to Beauty to make her forget
this waking. If the coin flip is heads, then when Beauty awakes on Tuesday (her
second awakening), she does not remember having ever been awakened before. If the
experimenters’ coin comes up tails, Beauty is awoken just once, on Tuesday.
The question of interest is what credence (i.e. degree of belief) Beauty should
rationally assign to the proposition “the coin landed on tails” upon awaking. As Peter
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Lewis points out in his “Quantum Sleeping Beauty” paper, the dominant answer to this
question in the sleeping beauty literature is “one third”, as argued for by Elga (2000),
Arntzenius (2002), and Dorr (2002) among others. There are those who support the
“one half” answer as well, most notably David Lewis (2001), but by far the most popular
intuition is that Beauty should have a credence of one third. I examine what I consider
to be the most persuasive argument for this “thirder” solution in the next section, but
a number of traditional thirder arguments run as follows: when Beauty awakes, she
has lost herself among three different outcomes: Heads/Monday, Heads/Tuesday, and
Tails/Tuesday. Elga argues that, if Beauty learns it is Tuesday, she is indifferent as to
whether the coin flip was heads or tails, and if she learns the coin flip came up heads,
she is indifferent as to whether it’s Monday or Tuesday. Thus, Elga argues, all three
outcomes should carry the same credence, and so Beauty should be a thirder. Halfers
like Lewis respond that Beauty learns no new information when she wakes up: she
knew she was going to wake up at least once no matter what the outcome. Thus, when
Beauty updates her credences using Bayes’ theorem, she finds that she should have
the same credence upon awaking that she had before going to sleep. Though halfer
arguments like Lewis’s have won their supporters, Peter Lewis points out that most
philosophers tend to favor the thirder position.
Peter Lewis uses the near-consensus on the sleeping beauty problem to raise an ob-
jection against the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanical probabilities. Put
simply, the Everett or “many worlds” interpretation of quantum mechanics holds that,
upon measurement, a quantum mechanical superposition of a spin-up and spin-down
electron, for instance, splits into two branches, one of which is characterized by a spin-
up electron and one of which is characterized by a spin-down electron. Many opponents
of Everett have claimed that the Everett interpretation cannot make sense of quantum
mechanical probabilities; however, recent discussions of Everettian probability, such
as those found in Greaves (2007), take subjective probability and decision-theoretic
axioms as central to a fully Everettian account of probability. By embracing subjective
probabilities, Everettians have found a way to talk about probabilities in quantum
mechanics that avoids the pitfalls of previous Everettian attempts; however, for Peter
Lewis, at least, such an application of subjective probabilities leads to problems for
the Everett interpretation.
Peter Lewis sees parallels here between the way in which Beauty’s possible-worlds
successors are related to one another and the way in which an agent’s many-worlds
successors are related to one another in the Everett interpretation. Lewis asks us to
consider three time-slices of Beauty in a world where the coin comes up “heads”: one,
the time-slice at t0, is Beauty before she goes to sleep. The second time-slice, at t1, is
Beauty when she is awoken on Monday, and the third time-slice, at t2, is Beauty when
she is awoken on Tuesday. Lewis points out that though Beauty at t0 is psychologically
continuous with Beauty at t1 and Beauty at t2, these two successors are barred from
being psychologically continuous with one another by the memory drug administered
to Beauty after each awakening. Likewise, in a two-branch Everettian case an agent
can be treated as having a successor in each of the two post-measurement worlds which
are psychologically continuous with the agent before the branching even though neither
successor is psychologically continuous with the other successor.
The similarity between an agent’s successors in the Everettian case and Beauty’s
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time-slices in the sleeping beauty problem leads Lewis to posit that the rational as-
signment of credences (i.e. subjective probabilities) in both cases should agree. Lewis
states, “given the parallels between the two cases, then all other things being equal, we
should expect the two cases to be governed by a uniform account of probability” (62).
Lewis goes on to show that such an account cannot be achieved. I present a variant of
the case Lewis examines in his paper to show how the sleeping beauty and “quantum
sleeping beauty” cases differ1.
Consider Beauty’s sister Qeauty, who participates in an experiment similar to
Beauty’s. The experimenters put Qeauty to sleep on Sunday and flip a coin. If the
result of the flip is “heads”, they do an x-spin measurement on an electron in a su-
perposition of x-spin up and x-spin down (with probabilities of one half corresponding
to each outcome per the Born rule). If the result of the measurement is x-spin up,
they wake up Qeauty up on Monday then put her back to sleep. If the result of the
measurement is x-spin down, they wake her up on Tuesday and then put her back to
sleep. Finally, if the coin lands on tails, the experimenters wake Qeauty up on Tuesday,
then put her back to sleep.
Assuming that Qeauty is an Everettian, her case mirrors her sister’s in many ways.
First of all, Qeauty in a world where heads is flipped is similar to Beauty in a world
where heads is flipped by Lewis’s lights: Qeauty has two successors here, both of whom
are psychologically continuous with pre-branching Qeauty but, by the Everettian’s
lights, are not psychologically continuous with each other. Likewise, Beauty has two
post-Sunday successors, both of whom are psychologically continuous with Sunday
Beauty but which are not psychologically continuous with each other because of the
forgetfulness drug. Finally, as in the Beauty case, Qeauty has self-locating uncertainty:
that is, she may be on one of many branches, yet when she wakes up, she does not
know which branch she is on. Given the many similarities between the Beauty and
Qeauty cases, Lewis’s claim that the same account of probability should govern both
cases seems reasonable.
If Lewis is right, one would expect that the Everettian’s account of subjective
probability in the Qeauty case should agree with the consensus about credences in
the Beauty case. However, Lewis points out that this expectation is not met. The
assessment of probability supported by Everettians, Lewis claims, requires that one
take the halfer position to be the correct one in the Qeauty case; an Everettian Qeauty
will treat her situation as if the probability of being awoken on Monday and the coin
being heads is the same as the probability of flipping heads twice on a fair coin, or
one quarter2. An Everettian Qeauty will thus treat the probability of the coin landing
on heads as equal to the probability of the coin landing on tails, which entails the
halfer solution. Since the popular solution to the Beauty case is the thirder solution,
Lewis’s expectation that the credences in these two cases should mirror each other is
clearly violated. Lewis states that he would be content with such divergence if the two
cases were obviously disanalogous, but, since the epistemic similarity between Beauty’s
and Qeauty’s successors in the two cases leads us to believe that the two cases should
1I should note that what I call the Quantum Sleeping Beauty problem or case is one of several problems
that Lewis presents in his paper; however, I take it that, should my response to the case I pose in this paper
be sufficient, an analogous solution will be available as a response to Lewis’s other problems.
2Lewis (2007), pp 63.
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treat probability the same way, the divergence seems to indicate a problem either with
the logic of the thirder Beauty or of the halfer Qeauty. Lewis’s own position is that
this inconsistency poses a problem primarily for the Everettian, and so his “quantum
sleeping beauty” argument gives us a reason to reject the Everettian’s account of
probability.
Papineau and Dura-Vila (2009) raise some issues with Lewis’s argument, primar-
ily arguing that there are important metaphysical differences between the Beauty and
Qeauty cases that Lewis fails to acknowledge, and thus Lewis is wrong to expect the
two cases to treat probability analogously. I agree with Papineau and Dura-Vila that
there is an important distinction between Beauty’s case and Qeauty’s case that needs
to be taken into account, but I do not think that Papineau and Dura-Vila’s metaphys-
ical charges are specific or detailed enough to pose much of a threat to the quantum
sleeping beauty argument. My purpose in this paper is to examine the metaphysical
and epistemological differences between the Beauty and Qeauty cases and, on this ba-
sis, determine if Lewis’s argument for a troubling tension between the Everettian and
the thirder is as powerful as Lewis suggests. In particular, I examine the way in which
diachronic Dutch book arguments suggest that the thirder solution to the Beauty case
is correct while the halfer solution in the Qeauty case is correct. These Dutch book
arguments, I argue, reveal an important disanalogy between the two cases, and thus
Lewis’s argument does not reveal an inconsistency in either the Everettian’s or the
thirder’s treatment of probability.
2 Beauty, Qeauty, and Dutch Books
In his “Beauty and the Bets”, Hitchcock provides what I take to be the strongest
argument in favor of the thirder position for the Beauty case. Hitchcock argues that
a diachronic Dutch book can be made against the halfer in the traditional Sleeping
Beauty case even when strict conditions are imposed on the Dutch bookie in this sce-
nario. Dutch books reveal incoherent credences at play; for instance, if my credences
require that I have a credence of both one half and one quarter in the same outcome, a
Dutch book argument may be constructed against me. One can thus, like Hitchcock,
take the existence of a Dutch book against a position as a reason to accept its alter-
natives. What follows is a basic reconstruction of Hitchcock’s argument, which shows
how such a book may be constructed in Beauty’s case.
Hitchcock first proposes a Dutch book that could be made against the thirder.
The bets in this book exploit the fact that the thirder position violates the reflection
principle: that is, according to the thirder, Beauty should take the probability of a
tails on the coin flip to be one half before going to sleep but one third upon waking
up. The halfer could thus propose the following two bets, the first of which is taken by
Beauty before falling asleep and other of which is taken by Beauty after she wakes up:
Bet 1 (before sleep): $30 if tails, nothing if heads. Cost: $15
Bet 2 (upon awaking): $30 if heads, nothing if tails. Cost: $20
A thirder Beauty will find both of these bets acceptable at the time they are suggested:
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her credence in tails at the time of the first bet is one half, and her credence in heads
at the time of the second bet is two thirds. However, if she accepts these bets, she
loses money. If the coin comes up heads, she receives $30 from Bet 2 and $0 from Bet
1, which is not enough to offset the $35 she paid for the two bets. Likewise, if the coin
comes up tails, she receives $30 from Bet 1 and $0 from Bet 2, which is not enough to
offset the $35 she paid for the two bets. Thus, she loses $5 no matter what, and these
bets constitute a Dutch book.
Not so fast, Hitchcock says. One of the crucial assumptions made concerning the
bookie in these diachronic Dutch book cases is that he has no more information than
the book-ee has3. While this condition may not seem relevant to the above argument,
consider the conditions upon which Bet 2 is taken. The above Dutch book requires
that Bet 2 be given to Beauty “upon awaking”, but in the case where the coin lands
on heads, this instruction is ambiguous since Beauty wakes up twice. The bookie must
only give Bet 2 to Beauty once for the above Dutch book to be a Dutch book, for if
two Bet 2s are made, Beauty makes $60 while paying only $55 and thus obtains a $5
payoff. Therefore, the Dutch bookie must have information that Beauty doesn’t (i.e.
how many Bet 2s have been offered in the past) when he proposes his bets if he wants
to be guaranteed to make money off of Beauty no matter what. Since a Dutch book
requires that bookie and book-ee have the same information available to them, the
above “diachronic Dutch book” is not actually a Dutch book4.
Hitchcock suggests the following consideration so that the above mistake above does
not happen again: the bookie in the sleeping beauty problem should go to sleep at the
same time Beauty does, be awakened when Beauty is awakened, and be administered
the same drugs Beauty takes. If these conditions are respected, the bookie will not
have any information Beauty lacks. Hitchcock provides a new Dutch book argument
that respects this consideration, but his argument is now against the halfer. Consider
the following new bets:
Bet 1′ (before sleep): $30 if heads, nothing if tails. Cost: $15
Bet 2′ (upon each awaking): $20 if tails, nothing if heads. Cost: $10
3Such a condition must be imposed so that the Bayesian updating of credences is not found incoherent:
if a paleontologist has some reasonable credence x that the dinosaurs were destroyed by a meteor, and if
there is, unbeknownst to him, a dinosaur skeleton yet to be discovered which would lead him to rationally
update his credence to y upon discovering this skeleton, one would not want to say that his assignment of
credences in these cases was somehow incoherent.
4One can, in fact, construct a more general proof that no Dutch book may be constructed against the
thirder given the Beauty setup. The following is a short sketch of such a proof. Assume, as Hitchcock
does, that the second set of bets are now made upon waking up and that the cost of the nth bet is Qncn,
where Qn is the payoff for the nth bet and cn is the credence Beauty has in the outcome that awards her
Qn (Beauty will take such bets since Qncn is the fair price for these bets). There are two situations: one
in which the coin is heads, and one where it is tails. If the coin flip results in heads, the bookie makes
Q1c1 + 2Q2c2 − Q1, while if the coin flip results in tails, the bookie makes Q1c1 + Q2c2 − Q2. For this
problem c1 is assumed to be
1
2
and the thirder chooses c2 =
1
3





Q1− 23Q2. Since one of these payoffs is the negation of the other, the bookie can never be assured that
he will make money, and thus he cannot Dutch book a thirder Beauty.
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These bets are acceptable to Beauty assuming the credences of the halfer. Now, two
situations arise involving these bets. Consider first the case where the coin flip is tails:
Beauty takes Bet 1′ before falling asleep, then takes Bet 2′ when she awakes, which is
only once. She pays $25 for the two bets and, because the flip was tails, she makes
$20. Overall, then, she has lost $5. Now, consider the case where the coin flip is heads:
Beauty takes Bet 1′ before falling asleep, but since she is awakened twice, she makes
Bet 2′ twice. Thus, she pays $35 overall for the three bets, but, because only Bet
1′ provides her with any payoff, she only makes $30. Again, Beauty loses $5. Since
Beauty loses $5 no matter what, and since the bookie has no more information than
Beauty has when he proposes these bets, the above bets constitutes a Dutch book
against the halfer.
The fact that a Dutch book can be made against a halfer Beauty but not a thirder
Beauty gives one a reason to prefer the thirder solution to the traditional sleeping
beauty problem, but can it help with the Qeauty case? The cases are, after all, sup-
posedly analogous, according to Lewis. I argue that no Dutch book can be made
against a halfer Qeauty, and thus Hitchcock’s result for the Beauty case does not carry
over to the Qeauty case. Let’s examine the Dutch book argument against the halfer in
the Beauty case to see if the same argument holds in the Qeauty case; if so, it would
seem that Lewis’s condemnation of the Everettian for her halfer solution is unjustified.
Again, examine the following two bets:
Bet 1′ (before sleep): $30 if heads, nothing if tails. Cost: $15
Bet 2′ (upon each awaking): $20 if tails, nothing if heads. Cost: $10
If Qeauty is a halfer, she accepts both of these bets when they are offered. Now, assume
that the coin flip lands on tails. Qeauty takes Bet 1′ and Bet 2′ once each. She pays
$25 for the two bets combined and only makes $20 from Bet 2′, so she loses $5 overall.
The situation involving a heads on the coin flip is a bit more complicated. There are
two possibilities should the coin land on heads: the spin-measurement following the
coin flip could yield an up or down spin result corresponding to a branch in which
Qeauty is awakened on Monday or a branch where Qeauty is awakened on Tuesday
respectively. Consider the first branch: the coin flip is heads on this branch, and the
spin measurement is up. Qeauty’s successor is awakened only once on this branch, so,
as in the tails case, she takes Bet 1′ and Bet 2′ once each. She pays $25 for the two bets
combined but gets a payoff of $30, thus gaining $5. The down measurement case is the
same: Qeauty’s successor is only awakened once, so she takes both bets only once and
ends up making $5. Since Qeauty makes $5 if the coin lands on heads (regardless of
the spin measurement outcome) and loses $5 if the coin lands on tails given this series
of bets, these bets do not constitute a Dutch book5.
5One can, in fact, construct a more general proof that no Dutch book may be constructed against the
halfer given the Qeauty setup. This proof follows along the lines of the proof given in footnote 4: the bookie
will make either Q1c1 + Q2c2 − Q1 or Q1c1 + Q2c2 − Q2. If c1 is 12 and the halfer takes c2 to be 12 , then
the payoff is either 1
2
Q2 − 12Q1 or 12Q1 − 12Q2. Since one payoff is negative if the other is positive, the
bookie cannot be assured that he will make money off of a halfer Qeauty, and so the halfer Qeauty cannot
be Dutch booked.
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Now, consider the original bets the Hitchcock proposed as a “Dutch book” against
the thirder Beauty:
Bet 1 (before sleep): $30 if tails, nothing if heads. Cost: $15
Bet 2 (upon awaking): $30 if heads, nothing if tails. Cost: $20
These bets did not constitute a diachronic Dutch book against the thirder because
Beauty was awakened twice if the coin flip came out heads, meaning that the bookie
would have to know that Bet 2 had not been previously offered to Beauty for this
series of bets to constitute a Dutch book. Such information went beyond what was
available to Beauty, but in Qeauty’s case, the analogous information needed would be
that Bet 2 has not been offered to Qeauty at any point in the past along any individual
branch. This information is available to Qeauty and her bookie both since each know
that there is only one awakening along any individual path. Let’s examine this point
in more detail. Consider the case in which tails is flipped. In this case, Qeauty is
awakened only once, as is the bookie, and so Qeauty loses $5 if she has accepted both
Bet 1 and Bet 2 (she has paid $35 and won only $30). Consider now the case in which
heads is flipped and the measurement yields a value of spin-up. In this history, there
has been no Bet 2 offered to Qeauty, and so when the bookie and Qeauty are awakened,
he offers her Bet 2 and she accepts, meaning that Qeauty loses $5 (she has paid $35
and won only $30). Likewise, the bookie’s successor in the spin-down world has never
offered Qeauty Bet 2 before, so the bookie makes $5 on this branch. Qeauty is not
awakened again on any of these branches, and thus, no matter what the coin flip result
or the spin measurement result, Qeauty’s successors are awakened only once, meaning
that the bookie needs no extra information about which world (or branch) he is in to
be able to propose the Dutch book. Bets 1 and 2 constitute a Dutch book for Qeauty
since the bookie is placed in the same epistemic situation as Qeauty and can offer her
a series of bets she would accept which always lead to her losing money.
What I have shown in this section is the following: in the Beauty case, one has a
reason to prefer the thirder solution since a diachronic Dutch book can be constructed
against the halfer but not against the thirder; in the Qeauty case, however, one has a
reason to prefer the halfer solution since a diachronic Dutch book can be constructed
against the thirder but not the halfer. This disagreement, I believe, suggests that there
is some important difference between the Beauty and Qeauty cases that provides the
disanalogy Lewis claimed would be fatal to his argument.
3 The Difference
To say that the Beauty and Qeauty cases are disanalogous simply because diachronic
Dutch books can be made against different positions in these two cases would be too
facile. In this section I discuss what differences between the two cases underwrite
their Dutch book disagreement. My analysis shows that, in Papineau and Dura-Villa’s
words, one can be both a thirder (with respect to the Beauty case) and an Everettian.
I start my analysis again with Hitchcock’s “Beauty and the Bets” paper, where
he identifies the crucial feature of the Beauty setup that leads to the Dutch book
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argument against the halfer: “Thus the actual number of awakenings that occurs in
the two different outcomes does play a central role in the solution to the problem”
(415). Hitchcock’s analysis here seems right; what made Beauty’s Dutch book against
the halfer work was the fact that one coin flip outcome corresponded to a different
number of awakenings than the other coin flip outcome. It is not surprising, then,
that Beauty’s halfer Dutch book does not succeed in the Qeauty case where each of
Qeauty’s successors is awoken only once. In the Dutch book against the halfer Beauty,
the “heads” case of these bets yields a $5 payoff to the bookie because Bet 1′ is made
only once while Bet 2′ is made twice. In the Qeauty analogue, however, each bet is
made only once.
This difference in the number of awakenings between the cases might seem strange;
after all, Lewis has provided grounds on which to expect Everettian branching to
behave like taking the forgetfulness drug in the Beauty case. However, what Lewis
failed to take into account was that each Everettian branch is causally isolated from
the other branches. If Beauty were to get a tattoo after her first awakening after a
heads flip, she would have that same tattoo upon her second awakening. However,
Qeauty’s spin-up successor’s actions never affect Qeauty’s spin-down successor. There
is thus a metaphysical difference between the two cases.
This metaphysical difference between the two cases can be understood in many
ways: one could cash out the difference in terms of causality (or at the very least coun-
terfactuals) since Beauty’s two heads-successors are causally connected while Qeauty’s
two heads-successors are causally isolated. One other option would be to express this
difference in terms of identity: Beauty’s two heads-successors can be understood as
“the same person”, or Beauty’s Tuesday-heads-successor could be thought of as the
successor of Beauty’s Monday-heads-successor; however, Qeauty’s heads-successors are
counter-parts and are not properly regarded as identical, nor is either the successor
of the other. Finally, one could understand this metaphysical difference in terms of
independence of events. Beauty’s Monday-waking and Tuesday-waking on the heads
branch are not properly independent events: one can happen only if the other happens.
However, in the Qeauty cases, the Monday-waking and Tuesday-waking events on the
heads branch are as independent from each other as they are from the Tuesday-waking
event on the tails branch6.
I believe any of these ways of understanding the metaphysical difference between
the Beatuy and Qeauty cases is valid, and, depending on one’s stance on various
issues in metaphysics, several of these differences may be equivalent; however, Lewis
asked for a salient epistemological difference between the cases, and so, before ending
my discussion, I must provide such a difference. I think the metaphysical differences
previously considered are suggestive here. Let’s consider the kinds of uncertainty that
both Beauty and Qeauty are faced with when they wake up; that is, what kinds of
self-locating uncertainty they have to deal with. Beauty is uncertain of what the coin
flip result was and what day it is, but she is uncertain of one further thing: whether
she’s been awakened before. A thirder Beauty assigns a one-third credence to the
6I do not pretend here that I have fully spelled-out what the metaphysical difference between the Beauty
and Qeauty cases consists in, but such detailed exposition was not my goal; rather, I have hopefully provided
sufficient (and minimal) metaphysical grounds in which one can base a rejection of Lewis’s claim that the
Beauty and Qeauty cases should be treated as analogous.
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proposition that she has been awakened before. Qeauty, like Beauty, is also uncertain
of what day it is and what the coin flip result was (and, what’s more, she’s even
uncertain of the spin-measurement outcome), but she is certain that she has never
been awakened before. No matter what branch Qeauty wakes on, she knows that this
waking event is both her first and her last for the duration of the experiment. Thus,
the fact that Beauty is uncertain about whether she’s been awakened before when she
awakes indicates an epistemic difference between her case and the case of Qeauty, who
knows that she will only be awakened once on each branch.
So what should the Everettian’s response to Lewis be? It should be something
like this: in the Beauty case, the thirder’s position seems correct; however, were the
situation to involve not one person waking up twice but two successors being awoken
once each, as Everettians take the Qeauty case to involve, the halfer solution would
be the correct one. Thus, from the fact that the thirder solution holds in the Beauty
case, it does not follow that the thirder solution is correct in the Qeauty case as well.
4 Conclusion
Convincing though Lewis’s quantum sleeping beauty argument may seem at first, it
hinges on the parallels between what I have called the Beauty and Qeauty cases. The
parallels that Lewis considers, however, are swamped out by differences between the
two cases, which are indicated by the diachronic Dutch books that may be made
against a halfer Beauty and a thirder Qeauty. These Dutch books are indicative of
various metaphysical and epistemological differences between the two cases and provide
ample motivation to reject Lewis’s analogy; thus, despite Lewis’s claims, the quantum
sleeping beauty case does not reveal inconsistencies in the Everettian’s treatment of
probability7.
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